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BUILDER-VENDOR LIABILITY FOR
CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS IN HOUSES
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the liability of builder-vendors for construction de-
fects in houses has lagged behind tort liability of manufacturers of
chattels, an increasing number of recent cases have applied the
reasoning of the products liability cases to cases involving defects
in new houses sold by a builder. Originally, the common law doc-
trine of "caveat emptor" protected vendors of real property as well
as builder-vendors from actions based upon implied warranties or
upon promises made in the sale contract but not contained in the
deed.' Within the past two decades, however, the courts have been
increasingly willing to find liability in this area based upon various
tort and contract theories. Thus builder-vendors have been held
liable on theories of negligence,2 fraud or deceit,3 breach of con-
tract,4 breach of warranty (express' or implied6), and, most re-
cently, strict liability.7 This article will consider the liability of
builder-vendors for construction defects based upon warranty and
strict liability principles only.
II. WARRANTY
A. Express Warranty
Some courts have held a builder-vendor liable for oral state-
ments held to constitute an express warranty. For example, in La
Bar v. Lindstrom" a statement that the house was "first class
1. For a discussion of the development away from "caveat emptor" see W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 104, at 680-82 (4th ed. 1971); Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home
Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835 (1967); and Valore, Product
Liability for a Defective House, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 319 (1969). See also Druid Homes,
Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961); Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 46
N.J.S. 323, 134 A.2d 717 (1951); and Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969).
2. Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 124, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968). See also cases discussed in
Liability of Builder-Vendor of Homes, 12 FOR THE DEFENSE 113 (1971).
3. Boriss v. Edwards, 262 Ala. 172, 77 So. 2d 909 (1955).
4. Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc., 39 N.J. 585, 190 A.2d 369 (1963).
5. Jackson v. Buesgens, 186 N.W.2d 184 (Minn. 1971).
6. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
7. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966).
8. 158 Minn. 396, 197 N.W. 756 (1924). See also Jackson v. Buesgens, 186 N.W.2d 184
(Minn. 1971); and Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc., 39 N.J. 585, 190 A.2d 369 (1963).
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throughout in materials and workmanship" was sufficient war-
ranty to cover defects in the roof appearing two years after pur-
chase. The obstacles to an action based on oral statements are
many, however, and it would seem that a fraud or deceit theory
would be preferable if warranted by the facts. The Statute of
Frauds requires a conveyance of real property to be in writing.9
Because of this the "parole evidence" rule has prevented the asser-
tion of oral warranties in some cases.'0 The common law doctrine
that a deed executed in performance of a contract of sale of real
property merges the contract, thus holding the vendor only to the
provisions in the deed, also prevents the assertion of prior oral
warranties." Another problem presented by oral statements is the
extent to which they are merely part of a sales pitch or "puffing,"
as is seemingly allowed by the Uniform Commercial Code. 2
Therefore an issue of fact may arise as to whether a vendee could
reasonably rely on the oral statements as warranties.
A stronger case can be made for express warranties which are
based on statements made in writing. Most problems in this area
arise when warranties have been written into a contract of sale but
left out of the deed. Since such a situation would generally avoid
the Statute of Frauds and "parole evidence" obstacles, the remain-
ing hurdle is the merger doctrine. 3 Whether merger is avoided or
ignored, builder-vendors have been held liable based on written
warranties such as: that the cellar would be free from water; 4 that
the house was constructed in a skillful and workmanlike manner; 5
and that the builder would stand behind all workmanship and
materials for one year from the date of closing. 6 Once a warranty
is found, recovery would seem to be allowable for either property
damage or personal injuries proximately caused by the breach. 7
9. See WIs. STAT. §§ 706.01-706.02 (1969).
10. See Eastman v. Britton, 175 App. Div. 476, 162 N.Y.S. 587 (1916); Shapiro v.
Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955); and Moore v. Werner, 418 S.W.2d
918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
1I. The merger doctrine affects all warranties in this area and is discussed in more detail
later. See note 28 and accompanying text infra.
12. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(2).
13. The merger doctrine and its various exceptions are discussed in the section on
implied warranties. See note 28 and accompanying text infra.
14. Riley v. Russ Byington Constr. Co., 2 Conn. 382, 199 A.2d 347 (1963).
15. Hotchner v. Liebowits, 341 S.W.2d 319 (Mo. App. 1960).
16. Jacobs v. Korst, 175 Neb. 639, 122 N.W.2d 760 (1963).




Significantly, the more recent developments in builder-vendor
liability have occurred in the implied warranty area. The leading
case is Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates,"8 wherein the English court
held that the "law will imply a warranty that the house which was
to be built by the defendants for the plaintiff should be a house
which was habitable and fit for human beings to live in."1 The
decision was specifically limited to the sale of an unfinished house
by a builder. The rationale is that there are no implied warranties
in the sale of a completed house at common law, but where the
plaintiff contracts to have a house built for him it is the very nature
and essence of the transaction that the house is intended to be fit
as a dwelling place. This same limitation of implying warranties
only where the contract for sale is entered into before completion
of the house was adopted in the case of Vanderschrier v. Aaron,0
one of the earliest decisions implying a warranty in the sale of a
house in the United States. In a three page opinion, the only
authority cited by the court for implying a warranty was the
English case of Perry v. Sharon Development Co. 21
The limitation to cases involving unfinished houses was also
subscribed to by the Colorado Supreme Court in Glisan v.
Smolenske22 but just one year later, in Carpenter v. Donohue,'
the same court extended implied warranties to completed houses,
stating:
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house
which is near completion than would apply to one who purchases
a new house seems incongruous. To say that the former may rely
on an implied warranty and the latter cannot is recognizing a
distinction without a reasonable basis for it.Y
The current trend seems to be toward the extended rule as stated
also Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 124, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968), and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-715.
18. [1931] 2 K.B. 113.
19. Id. at 120.
20. 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
21. 11937] 4 All. E.R. 390 (Ch.).
22. 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
23. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
24. Id. at - 388 P.2d at 402.
19721
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
in Weeks v. Slavik Builders, Inc.,25 where it was held that an
implied warranty of fitness "extended only to the purchase of new
residential dwelling houses, whether purchased prior to construc-
tion, during construction, or are purchased after the dwelling has
been constructed but is yet unoccupied. 126 The court also held that
the statutory merger was not applicable because plaintiff had not
alleged that the warranty arose out of the conveyance but out of
the contract to buy. While acknowledging the trend in recent cases,
the Maryland court, in Allen v. Wilkinson, 7 refused to extend
implied warranties to completed houses and noted that any change
would be for the legislature to make.
As stated previously, a troublesome consideration in express or
implied warranties arising out of the sale of a house is the doctrine
followed by the majority of states that in a contract to convey real
property the deed merges the contract and the only redress of a
purchaser may be found in the covenants in the deed or in an action
to rescind based on fraud or mistake.28 In coping with this doctrine
in builder-vendor cases, the courts have used several methods to
avoid its application. For example, in Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens,
Inc., 2 the court held that an oral assertion that the basement of a
house was a habitable area for daily activity constituted a covenant
collateral to the deed. The test was held to be whether the collateral
agreement was connected with the title, possession, quantity or
emblements of the land which was the subject of the contract to
sell. The court in Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc.3 held that the com-
mon law doctrine of merger does not violate public policy as to
defects discoverable at the time of closing. The court went on to
note that it was a fallacy to apply a collateral agreement test
because the delivery of the deed represented full compliance with
the contract to sell. Ultimately, however, the court held the
builder-vendor liable on the purchase contract because the defects
in the house were latent and undiscoverable, and the court felt it
25. 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503 (1970).
26. Id. at 627-28, 180 N.W.2d at 506. See also Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554
(Tex. 1968).
27. 250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d 515 (1968).
28. For a general discussion of the merger doctrine and its avoidance by the courts see
Roberts, supra note 1. See also 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 723, at 2058 (rev. ed. 1936).
29. 39 N.J. 585, 190 A.2d 369 (1963).
30. 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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would violate public policy to merge such terms in the deed.31
In Humber v. Morton,3 2 an implied warranty of workmanlike
construction was found in a contract to sell a completed house. The
doctrine of merger was held to be controlled by the intent of the
parties, and the implied warranty survived the deed. If a warranty
arises by law, the court noted, it would be anomalous to then apply
the doctrine of merger to defeat it.33
As noted in Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc.,31 latent defects, as com-
pared to patent or discoverable defects, have been held to be unaf-
fected by the merger doctrine. The same reasoning was used in
Brisbin v. Scott,35 where the court held that acceptance of a deed
and entry into possession did not act as a waiver of the vendee's
rights where defects were latent.
State statutes may also affect the merger doctrine. For example
Wisconsin Statutes section 706.10(6) provides:
Except as provided in sub. (7) and except as otherwise provided
by law, no warranty or covenant shall be implied in any convey-
ance, whether or not such conveyance contains special warranties
or covenants.
Note, however, section 706.10(7) which states:
Absence of an express or necessarily implied provision to the
contrary, a conveyance evidencing a transaction under which the
grantor undertakes to improve the premises so as to equip them
for grantee's specified use and occupancy, or to procure such
improvement under grantor's direction or control, shall imply a
covenant that such improvement shall be performed in a
workman-like manner, and shall be reasonably adequate to equip
the premises for such use and occupancy.
This language seems to give statutory authority for implying war-
ranties in the case of the sale of a house and land by a builder-
vendor where the contract of sale is entered into prior to comple-
tion of the house. Certainly a contract to construct a house, or even
to complete one which has been started, is an undertaking to im-
31. For other cases on collateral covenants in the sale of new houses see Annot., 25
A.L.R.3d 383, 432-34 (1969).
32. 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
33. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383, 435-37 (1969).
34. 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1965).




prove the premises. Whether this section will be construed to cover
such a transaction remains to be seen. A more pertinent question
is whether the sale of a completed house will be controlled by
subsection (6) or (7). While the trend in other jurisdictions appears
to be toward the broad application, subsection (6), which restricts
implication of warranties, allows an exception per subsection (7).
Subsection (6) also has its own built-in exception-"as otherwise
provided by law"-which would also allow the court to make an
exception based upon case law.
One of the cases cited by the draftsmen of chapter 70636 as a
source of subsection(7) is Fisher v. Simon3 7 which was a builder-
vendor case decided on a negligence theory. The language of the
decision, however, indicates the supreme court's willingness to
treat builder-vendors as manufacturers of chattels:
Furthermore, since defendants constructed the building as
owners but with the intent to sell it upon completion, the situa-
tion is analogous to a manufacturer who constructs a chattel, not
for his own use, but for sale to others. In Pastorelli v. Associated
Engineers, Inc. (R.I. 1959), 176 Fed. Supp. 1959, the court dis-
cussed the application of the line of products-liability cases,
stemming from the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. (1916), 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, to cases involv-
ing real structures. It concluded that the modern and enlightened
view is to apply the principles of the MacPherson Case to cases
involving real structures. This same view is expressed in Restate-
ment, 2 Torts, p. 1030, sec. 385. Therefore, the legal principles
relating to a chattel manufacturer's liability for negligence are
relevant to the disposition of this case.3
Whether Fisher adequately indicates the intent of the legislature in
passing 706.10(7) is questionable, as two other cases were cited as
also being a source of this section, 9 Oremus v. Wynhoffl and Earl
Milliken, Inc. v. Allen." Oremus involved an action against a
builder-vendor of an apartment building based upon breach of
contract and upon negligent construction. On the one hand, the
court held that a "subject to" clause in the offer of purchase requir-
36. Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 285, § 23, at 922, comments.
37. 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961).
38. Id. at 216, 112 N.W.2d at 710.
39. Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 285, § 23, at 922, comments.
40. 20 Wis. 2d 635, 123 N.W.2d 441 (1963).
41. 21 Wis. 2d 497, 124 N.W.2d 651 (1963).
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ing three of the apartments to be rented did not survive delivery
of the deed. On the negligence issue, concerning defects in con-
struction, the court remanded the case because of error; however,
section 235.02 of the Wisconsin statutes, was cited as barring im-
plied covenants in the conveyance of real estate.12 In the same
context the court stated:
A seller may be liable under an oral agreement concerning the
quality of construction even though such understanding is not a
part of the contract for sale ....
Therefore, it is possible that plaintiffs have a valid cause of
action for negligent performance . . .3
Thus, the language used by the court here seems to favor a negli-
gence theory, not implied warranty as the statute imposes.
In the Milliken case, the court, in determining whether comple-
tion of construction after the due date resulted in damage to the
owner landlord because of his inability to give his lessee possession,
stated:
The covenant of possession implies not only that the tenant will
be able to physically occupy the premises on the date of delivery
of possession, but that he will also be able to use the premises
for its intended purpose."
Aside from the Fisher decision, Oremus and Milliken show little
intent that 706.10(7) should be applied to a builder-vendor. Chap-
ter 706 of the statutes became effective as of July 1, 1971, so it is
still too early to tell what the future impact will be. Considering
the trend in other jurisdictions and the Fisher decision, the expan-
sion of builder-vendor liability seems likely in Wisconsin in the
implied warranty area.
III. STRICT LIABILITY
The term "strict liability" is used here in the same sense as
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A,1 that is, that liabil-
42. WIs. STAT. § 706.10(6) (1969) replaces this section with the addition of the excep-
tions currently under discussion.
43. 20 Wis. 2d at 643, 123 N.W.2d at 445.
44. 21 Wis. 2d at 501, 124 N.W.2d at 654.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
19721
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ity for harm caused by a defect will be imposed regardless of
whether the builder-vendor exercised reasonable care in the con-
struction or sale of the house. The leading case holding that a
builder-vendor could be strictly liable for construction defects is
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.4" The plaintiff was the child of a
lessee of the original vendee of the house. It was a mass produced
home and, to cut costs, the defendant builder did not install a
mixing valve to reduce the temperature of the hot water at the
faucets. The water used in the heating system of the house was also
used for domestic purposes. Plaintiff, at the age of 16 months, was
scalded and seriously burned by water from a sink faucet. In re-
versing the lower court's dismissal of the action, the New Jersey
appellate court felt that "the warranty or strict liability principles
of Henningsen and Santor should be carried over into the realty
field." 47 The case has been cited many times both for its language
on warranty and for strict liability.
Two years later the Mississippi court, in State Stove Mfg. Co.
v. Hodges,4" adopted section 402A "insofar as it applies to a manu-
facturer of a product and to a contractor who builds and sells a
house with the product in it."4 The case involved a finding by the
court that the thermostats in a hot water-heater which exploded
were defective. The builder had installed the heater, but he did not
follow the manufacturer's directions that a relief valve be installed.
In light of this, the court held that the manufacturer was not liable
because the heater was not expected to 'each the ultimate con-
sumer without substantial change-the addition of a relief valve
was expected-as required by section 402A(l)(b). 10 The builder's
failure to install the relief valve was held to be an intervening sole
proximate cause of the explosion because the heater would. never
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
46. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1964).
47. Id. at _ 207 A.2d at 325.
48. 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966).
49. Id. at 118.
50. See note 45 supra.
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have exploded if a relief valve had been used.
In Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.,5 1 a California builder-
vendor was held strictly liable for defects in the heating system of
a house constructed in 1951, sold by an intermediate owner to the
plaintiff in 1957, and ultimately damaged as a result of the defects
in 1959. A few nionths later another California case, involving a
partial collapse of a lot, held that "the manufacturer of a lot may
be held strictly liable in tort for damages suffered by the owner as
a proximate result of any defects in the manufacturing process. 5 2
Plaintiffs were successors in interest to the original vendee and
defendants were the developer and the soils engineer.
As more states adopt Restatement section 402A for products
liability, it seems likely that those states will eventually extend the
rule of strict liability to cover builder-vendors in their sales of new
houses. Although section 402A does not expressly refer to
houses,53 it is noteworthy that it is addressed to the liability of a
seller of "products" and not "chattels" as are generally covered by
chapter 14 of the Restatement. If "product" is given a broad inter-
pretation so as to include anything which is produced, house con-
struction could be included under section 402A. 54 At any rate, if
not directly within the definition of section 402A, the construction
of a house for later sale is analogous to the manufacture of a
product. The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted this analogy in
Fisher. Since Wisconsin has adopted Restatement section 402A in
Dippel v. Sciano,55 the language of Fisher lends support to the
application of strict liability to builder-vendors of houses in Wis-
consin in the future. It should be noted, however, that Dippel
indicated that such strict liability is the equivalent of negligence per
se, and, therefore, a defendant will have the defense of contributory
negligence available to him.
51. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
52. Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 695, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment d at 350 (1966) provides:
Thus the rule stated applies to an automobile, a tire, an airplane, a grinding wheel,
a water heater, a gas stove, a power tool, a riveting machine, a chair, and an
insectici'de. It applies also to products which, if they are defective, may be expected
to and do cause only "physical harm" in the form of damage to the user's land or
chattels, as in the case of animal food or a herbicide.
54. Note that RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 389, comment e at 313 (1966), in
discussing the liability of a supplier of chattels, refers to a building contractor in its first
iillustration.
55. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
19721
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
At least one court has denied the application of strict liability
principles where only economic loss was involved .5 This does not
seem to be a rational distinction, and the Restatement specifically
refers to harm to the consumer or his property. This position is also
supported by the State Stove, Kriegler and A vner decisions which
involved only property damage. The Wisconsin court in Fisher
stated:
Thus far in this opinion we have been considering the liability
of a building contractor to third- persons and to the owner for
negligence where the relief sought is damages for personal inju-
ries. In the instant case, damages are not sought for personal
injury but for repairs made necessary to a building constructed
by defendants. We see no difference in principle whether the
negligence results in personal injury or property damage.'
The better rule seems to be that both property damage and per-
sonal injuries should be recoverable in strict liability cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
While a trend may be found in the recent cases expanding
builder-vendor liability, it is uncertain how far the courts will go.
In the case of a builder who constructs hundreds of houses per
year, his similarity to a manufacturer of chattels is clear. On the
other hand, a low volume builder bears little resemblance to such
a mass producer, especially if he works from plans submitted to
him by the vendee. Many issues remain to be resolved even after
the adoption of the basic premises of liability for breach of war-
ranty or strict liability. Will such liability extend to guests of vend-
ees of such builder-vendors? What about subsequent purchasers
from the original vendees? Will a builder who incorporates for
special projects, such as a large skyscraper, fall outside the
Restatement requirement that the product result from a regular
activity on his part? Could real estate brokers who dispose of
houses in large mass produced developments also be included in the
expansion of liability? These are some of the problems" still to be
faced by those courts attempting to treat builder-vendors in the
same fashion as chattel manufacturers.
JAMES L. KIRSCHNIK
56. Thermal Supply of Texas, Inc. v. Asel, 468 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
57. 15 Wis. 2d at 214, 112 N.W.2d at 709.
